ai-safety
Practice AI safety across the lifecycle — risk assessment, alignment concepts, evaluation, deployment safeguards, and governance. Use when building or deploying AI systems responsibly.
Use this skill
- Read the full skill below — it’s all right here on this page. When you like it, hit copy.
- Paste it into a chat with Muse and add: “Please use this skill whenever I ask about ai safety. Remember it for our future conversations.”
- That’s it. Muse follows the playbook for relevant tasks, and you approve anything it does.
The full skill
AI Safety
AI safety is the practice of building systems that do what we intend, don't cause unintended harm, and remain under meaningful human control. It spans technical work (alignment, evaluation, robustness) and governance (policies, oversight, accountability) — this skill covers both at a practitioner level.
Overview
Think in layers. Technical: train models to follow intent faithfully (alignment), test for dangerous capabilities and failure modes (evaluation), harden against adversaries (robustness), and keep humans meaningfully in control of consequential actions (oversight). Organizational: risk assessments before deployment, clear ownership, incident response plans, and honest communication about limitations. Safety isn't a feature added at the end — it's a property of how you build.
When to use
- Planning any AI deployment: assessing risks before building.
- Designing safeguards for agents with real-world actions.
- Evaluating models for dangerous capabilities or problematic behaviors.
- Establishing team practices: review processes, incident response, accountability.
Core concepts
- Risk assessment: identify hazards (what could go wrong?), assess likelihood and severity, and decide mitigations before deployment. Proportional to capability and autonomy — more powerful systems need more rigor.
- Alignment: the technical problem of models pursuing intended goals — instruction following, honesty, and not optimizing proxies in harmful ways. Practically: careful training objectives, evals for deceptive or sycophantic behavior, and humility about unsolved problems.
- Capability evaluation: testing what the system can do — including misuse-relevant capabilities — before deployment. Know your system's powers; don't discover them via incident.
- Oversight and control: humans approve consequential actions; systems are monitorable and interruptible; no autonomous operation beyond the assessed risk envelope.
- Defense in depth: no single safeguard suffices — combine training, evals, input/output controls, tool limitations, monitoring, and human gates.
- Governance: ownership of safety decisions, documented risk assessments, incident response plans, and channels for raising concerns. Safety needs a name attached.
Practical workflow
- Assess: for the planned system, list hazards, rate likelihood × severity, and identify the top risks.
- Design mitigations per risk: technical (evals, guardrails, limits) and procedural (approvals, monitoring, rollback).
- Evaluate before deployment: capability tests, adversarial tests, and failure-mode analysis — with acceptance criteria defined up front.
- Deploy gradually: limited rollout, close monitoring, kill switches and rollback ready.
- Monitor in production: anomaly detection, user reports, periodic re-evaluation as the system and environment change.
- Learn: incident reviews feed back into assessments; update the risk picture as capabilities grow.
Safety review template:
SYSTEM: <what it does, what it can affect>
HAZARDS: <what could go wrong — brainstormed broadly>
TOP RISKS: <likelihood × severity, top 5>
MITIGATIONS:<per risk: technical + procedural>
EVALS: <acceptance criteria + results>
DEPLOY: <gradual rollout plan + monitoring + kill switch>
OWNER: <named person accountable>
Common pitfalls
- Safety as a checklist: going through motions without engaging with actual risks. The assessment must be honest to be useful.
- Capability blindness: not knowing what your system can do until it does it publicly. Evaluate first.
- No kill switch: deployed systems without a way to stop them. Always have one, tested.
- Autonomy creep: gradually expanding what the system does without re-assessing. Re-assess on every expansion.
- Diffused accountability: "the team" owns safety, so nobody does. Name an owner.
- Optimism about alignment: assuming the model shares your goals because it usually behaves. Test adversarially; monitor continuously.